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PASSPORT DENIAL AND THE FREEDOM
TO TRAVEL
"Everyone has a right to leave any country, including his
own, and return to his country1."
I.
BACKGROLND
The right of the citizen to travel abroad has existed since
Roman times. Chapter II of the Magna Carta gave every free
man the right to leave the realm in times of peace thus pre-
venting the king from placing his enemies in national confine-
ment. The king by his royal perogrative may issue out his writ
ne exeat regnuam (let him not leave the kingdom), and pro-
hibit any of his subjects from traveling into foreign parts with-
out a license2. The French Constitution of 1791 recognized the
right of every citizen to live his life abroad in its declaration
of the rights of the man and citizen'. Following the Napole-
onic Wars, the right to travel abroad was generally recognized,
with the notable exception of Russia, where republican reform
had not yet taken place.
In the United States, the authority of the Secretary of State
to issue passports was made exclusive by the Act of Congress,
August 18, 18564. This was the first legislative enactment
relative to passports in the United States. The use of the term
"may grant" in this Act is a basis for the historic position of
the Attorney General of the United States that the authority
of the Secretary of State is to be exercised entirely at his dis-
cretion5 . During World War I most international boundaries
I The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 19 Dept. State Bull. 753
(1948).
2 1 Bl. Comm. 137.
3 The declaration of the rights of the man and citizen in the French Constitu-
tion of Dec. 14, 1791, the effectiveness of which was cancelled by a law,
passed in 1792, prohibiting citizens leaving the country without a passport.
4 11 Star. 60 (1856).
5 13 Ops. Att'y General, 89, 92 (1862); 23 Ops. Att'y General 509, 511
(1901).
were closed and after the entry of the United States into the
War, Congress passed an Act, still in force, giving the President
authority to issue a proclamation closing our borders to citi-
zens and aliens without a passport6. This Act was amended in
1941 to extend the Presidential power to include times of na-
tional emergency and aliens of waring states.
Until the recent cases of Kent v. Dulles and Dayton v.
Dulles' the State Department found authorization for the
regulation of passport issuance8 in an Act of Congress of 1952
invoked by Presidential proclamation, January 17, 195 3', under
which the Secretary of State issued regulations forbidding the
issuance of passports to members of the Communist Party and
further requiring passport applicants to answer under oath
questions in respect to past or present membership in the Com-
munist Party. Either an admission of present membership or
refusal to take the oath resulted in automatic denial of a pass-
port. The decisions in the Dayton and Kent cases are far from
conclusive even under present legislation since Congress has
established future standards for passport denial under the In-
ternal Security Act1". These standards have not yet been
utilized. The importance of the basis upon which a passport
may be denied is emphasized by the fact that under present law
it is illegal, as long as a declared emergency continues, for a
United States citizen to leave the country unless he has a pre-
viously issued passport. A heavy fine may be imposed for viola-
tion of the statute.
While the Department of State has continued to rely on
its historical discretionary powers established at a time when
a passport was not a requirement for international travel, the
courts have, during the last decade, been increasingly critical
of the unrestricted use of this power. The definition of liberty
found in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, is dearly broad enough to in-
6 40 Stat. 559 (1918); 22 U.S.C. §§223-26 (1946).
7357 U.S. 116 (1958).
8 22 CX.R. §§51.101-170 (Supp. 1958).
9 66 Star. 190, 8 U.S.C., § 1185.
10 64 Stat. 987. 993 (1950).
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dude the right of egress across national boundaries". The
decisions in Crandall v. Nevada", Edwards v. California3, and
Williams v. Fears4, although concerned with interstate travel,
reflect a philosophy of basic rights readily applicable to travel
abroad despite the fact of its omission in the Federal Constitu-
tion. Nevertheless federal courts have upheld the Secretary of
State's discretionary powers where the grounds of denial was
lack of citizenship' 5.
The right 6 of the Secretary of State to deny passports to
each of the plaintiffs because of their refusal to file an affidavit
concerning their membership in the Communist Party was
successfully challenged in two recent cases 7. In reversing the
Court of Appeals' 8 for the District of Columbia Circuit, the
United States Supreme Court held that the Secretary of State
was without authority under the applicable statutes to withhold
passports on such grounds 9.
Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority of five,
avoided the question of constitutionality of passport denial
under legislation such as now before Congress2", based the
decision on the inadequacy of the present statutory authoriza-
tion. Nevertheless the decision gave the first legal recognition
to the right to travel outside the United States as a civil liberty
of increasing importance to the ordinary citizen. In the instant
11 165 U.S. 528 (1897).
12 73 U.S. 35 (1867).
13 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
14 179 U.S. 270 (1900).
15 Perkins v. Elg., 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
16 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144
(1958).
17 22 C.F.R. §51.142 (1952), an applicant may be required to subscribe
under oath, to a statement of his membership, past or present, in the Com-
munist Party.
18 The Court of Appeals' opinion is reported in 248 F.2d 600 (1957).
19 Section 215 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (1952); Sec. 1 of
the Act of Congress, July 3, 1926.
20 Section 4110, H.R. 13318, 85th Congress, 2nd Session (1958).
case the court held that the right to travel abroad is protected
by the Fifth Amendment21 and that presently effective Presi-
dential enactments have not authorized the Secretary of State
to make Communist membership or association grounds for
the denial of a passport. Therefore petitioner could not be re-
quired to submit a non-communist affidavit as a condition pre-
cedent to his obtaining a passport. The area of permissible
denial was limited to the well established grounds of illegal
conduct or non-allegiance 2 . Although delegation of the execu-
tive plenary power to conduct foreign affairs without a standard
is permissible2", an appropriate standard is required where, as
here, a citizen's liberty is restricted, due to his political belief or
associations". The majority of the court in basing the decision
on the lack of statutory authorization have failed to resolve the
constitutional issues under the First Amendment, which will
arise when the passport control provision of the Internal Se-
curity Act of 195025 specifically authorizing such control be-
comes effective.
The dissenters argued that the Secretary had authority under
the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 19526 to deny
passports to those considered security risks. Congress assumed,
they reasoned, that the executive would exercise its historical
discretion where possible detriment to the United States was
involved. They asserted that it is the war time use of the
Secretary's discretion which must be considered, since the statute
in question is operative only in time of national emergency 7 or
war"s. The minority disagreed that there were only two Con-
gressionally approved grounds on which passports could be
21 Cf. Shachtman v. Dulles, (D.C. Cir. 1955), 225 F.2d 938 (1955).
22 32 Stat. 386 (1902), 22 U.S.C. §212 (1952).
2 3 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304 (1936).
2 4 American Communications Ass'n. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
25 64 Stat. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §§ 781, 785 (1952). After the Communist
Party has been required to register this Act makes it unlawful for a member
to receive a passport.
26 66 Stat. 190 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §1185 (1952).
27 Proc. No. 2914, 15 Fed. Reg. 9029 (1950).
28 66 Star. 190 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §1185 (1952).
269
denied, pointing out that the Secretary of State had exercised
broad discretion for over a century".
In light of the fact that passports had been denied for
security reasons prior to the Act of 19520, which made pass-
ports requisite as a war time or emergency measure, it would
seem that Congress intended that the Secretary's discretion
should be invoked on such grounds31.
The effect of these cases is to recognize the right to travel
as a Fifth Amendment "liberty" which cannot be denied except
through "due process of law32." The extent to which this
liberty may be restricted remains uncertain since the Fifth
Amendment merely requires that any restriction be "by due
process of law." Had the court chosen to consider the right
to travel as one aspect of the freedom of expression under the
First Amendment, such tests as "a clear and present danger"
or the well established prohibition on prior restraints of free-
dom of expression could serve as guide posts for future legis-
lative authorization of restraints in this area. As the court
previously suggested33, even these rights may be restricted when
the interests to be protected are as important as security con-
siderations. The appropriate criteria 4 may well be one distin-
guishing persons who have engaged in illegal, revolutionary
activity from those who have passively accepted "the party
line."
Ultimately the court will be called upon to balance our
interests in national security against those in the freedom to
travel abroad. A possible standard was suggested in the Shacht-
man33 case: "Does the ground for denial bear a reasonable re-
29 3 Moore, International Law Digest; 3 Hadcworth, ITternational Law, 493
(1942).
30 State Department Memorandum, May 29, 1956.
31 As to legislative intent, see, 96 Cong. Rec. 15631.
3 2 Comment, 23 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 260 (1956).
33 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
34 American Communications Ass'n. v. Douds, supra, note 18.
85 Spachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938 (App. D.C. 1955).
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lation to the conduct of foreign affairs?" The instant case,
by relying on the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment
have enabled the court to avoid this task for the present.
II.
IS THERE A RIGHT TO TRAVEL?
In recent years the threat of communism, the increasing
number of countries requiring a passport for entry, and finally,
statutes enacted in 1952" requiring a passport in order to
leave the United States, have created the need for re-evaluation
of the broad authority assumed by the Secretary of State to de-
termine the grounds on which the passports may be denied.
In passing it is interesting to note that the average Soviet
citizen is effectively restrained within the boundaries of his
country except in cases of exceptional political privilege. The
General Assembly of the United Nations has adopted the uni-
versal declaration of human rights which includes the right to
travel, but unfortunately the theory of this declaration has not
found practical application in the policies of the member states.
In the Shachtman case, the language of the court seemed
to denote recognition of freedom to travel as a natural right.
It is of course necessary to judicial recognition that this freedom
be found in specific constitutional provisions. The question as
to whether the right existed at common law has been a matter
of disagreement among legal historians; certainly the writ of
ne exeat regnua was effective to restrain this right as late as the
early part of the 18th century. In any case there is no evidence
as to whether the founding fathers intended to make a consti-
tutional provision for such a freedom.
Restrictions on travel abroad may be denials of First Amend-
ment freedom if viewed as one aspect of freedom of expression
and communication. If the denial of the passport is for the
purpose of preventing the expression by the American citizen of
his views while abroad, it may be clearly a violation of the First
86 See note 22, supra.
Amendment as a prior restraint on freedom of speech. Even
if it were granted that the Bill of Rights is not effective outside
the United States, it is still arguable that denial of passports
based on prior activity of the applicant is effective as a restraint
on activities within the United States.
In respect to the due process clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment, a federal circuit court has said:
The protection of procedural due process did
not disappear because the substantive right
effected is not a full grown vested right like
that in one's castle at common law37.
However the previous basic premise has been that due process
applies only to those things which can be clearly brought with-
in life, liberty, or property. Rather than be limited to specific,
fundamental rights which existed at the time the Fifth Amend-
ment was adopted, the protection of due process should be
extended to all normal activities of man. This proposition was
impliedly recognized by the Supreme Court in Bratton v.
Chandler38 . On the other hand, the concept long accepted by
most courts3" is one distinguishing between rights and privileges
in determining whether an activity is protected by the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
From consideration of these holdings it would seem that
as to the Fifth Amendment free travel is in itself included as
a liberty which cannot be denied without due process of law;
while on the other hand, with respect to the First Amendment,
freedom to travel is not included as one of the guarantees but
may be indirectly involved since the denial of free travel may
result in the denial of free speech. Any effective test, however,
37 Rutledge, Justice, in N.B.C. v. V.F.C.C., 132 F.2d 545 (D.C., Cir., 1942).
38 260 U.S. 110 (1922).
3 9 Abrams v. Daugherty, 60 Cal. App. 297, 212 P. 942 (1st Dist. 1922).




From the foregoing discussion it seems clear that there is
a constitutional right to free travel abroad which the courts are
willing to recognize. On the other hand, it seems equally clear
that, at this time of unparallelled international tension, the
abuse of this freedom could have a detrimental effect on na-
tional security and the effectiveness of foreign policy, out-
weighing its benefit to the individual.
As in the other areas of conflict between the individual and
society, an effective test for balancing the interests involved
must be found. To the individual whose business involves
foreign trade, the right to travel abroad is an important property
right; to the student or teacher in some fields it may be a virtual
necessity for the completion of their professional training; to
the tourist or a person with family connections abroad, the
right to travel is a substantial part of his right to "the pursuit
of happiness." In each of these instances the right of the indi-
vidual is ordinarily exercised for the benefit of the group. The
economic development fostered by the business man, the knowl-
edge acquired by the student or teacher, and the increased
understanding between the peoples fostered by the tourist must
be considered by any test and balanced against our interest in
national security.
In this "cold war" era in which the battle for men's minds
may well be the determinative factor, the value of a liberal
passport policy as a demonstration of the practical application
of democratic principles of personal liberty may be even more
important in furthering national security than a restrictive policy
of questionable effectiveness. That national security is more im-
portant than the right of the individual to travel abroad is un-
questioned but it does not follow therefrom that the freedom
to travel may be restricted, unless there is a demonstrable re-
lation between the restrictive policy and national security. Will
restrictive regulations aimed primarily at persons who have
publicly adopted "the party line" be effective in preventing
professional spies and saboteurs from entering and leaving the
country as their missions require? It would seem that spies
would be unlikely to do, say, or join any thing which would
link them with radical activity. Assuming such regulations
would be effective to restrict to some degree the movement of
such persons in and out of the country by normal means, the
ease with which a person may enter or leave the United States
across our long inland borders is notorious.
If passport denial under regulations such as those suggested
by the Secretary of State cannot be shown to be effective and
necessary adjunct to national security, they are unreasonable
abridgements of the constitutional rights citizens possess under
the Fifth Amendment.
Roger M. Johnson
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